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Abstract
In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral
interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw.
We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that
a Nash stable network is either the empty network or the complete network. The
complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited
farsightedness, stable networks immune to bilateral deviations must be complete
M -partite networks, with partitions of different sizes. The empty network is the
efficient network. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the
importance of network structure in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions.
In particular, we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw has a non-
monotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network
formation when the actions of individuals are neither strategic complements nor
strategic substitutes.
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1 Introduction
A contest is a strategic interaction in which opposing parties make costly investments in
order to increase their chances of gaining control over scarce resources. Contests have been
studied in different settings, including political rent seeking (Hillman and Riley, 1989),
discretionary spending of top managers (Inderst et al., 2007), competition for funding
(Pfeffer and Moore, 1980), sport (Szymanski, 2003), litigation (Sytch and Tatarynowicz,
2014), and armed conflict (Ko¨nig et al., 2017). Agents often compete with several oppo-
nents simultaneously. In this case, the set of bilateral contest relations in a population
can be described as a network, in which each agent is a node, and a link indicates the
contest between two agents. Contest networks emerge in many situations. For instance,
(Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014) studies the observed network of patent infringements
and antitrust lawsuits among US pharmaceutical firms. (Ko¨nig et al., 2017) theoreti-
cally and empirically demonstrates the importance of the network structure of conflicts
among groups in the Second Congo War. One may also expect that the structure of
a contest network has important implications in other settings, including distributional
conflicts in a federation as in (Wa¨rneryd, 1998), lobbying for discretionary spending
of top managers as in (Inderst et al., 2007), and appropriation of property rights as in
(MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013).
In this paper we propose a model in which players make costly investments (exert
costly effort) to extract resources from other players in the society. It is a model of
weighted network formation, in which players choose with whom to engage in a bilateral
contest and how much to invest in each of their contests. Our starting point is the model
introduced in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015). In their model, the set of bilateral contests in
the population is given, hence the contest network is exogenous. The prize of a contest is
a fixed transfer from the loser to the victor. Our first departure from (Franke and Ozturk,
2015) is in the definition of the bilateral contest game, where we use a different specifica-
tion which, being more general than one used in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015), allows ties.
The main difference between our paper and (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) is that we pro-
pose a model in which the structure of the contest network is determined endogenously.
In our model, agents decide both with whom to fight and how much effort to exert in
each of their contests. We say that a link between two players exists or that they are
engaged in a contest when at least one of them invests a nonzero effort in fighting the
other. In this setting, our first task is to describe the efficient network architecture that
maximizes the sum of benefits of all agents in the population. We proceed by providing a
characterization of stable network structures under different notions of stability. Finally,
we provide several comparative statics results which highlight the importance of the net-
work structure when assessing how changes in parameters of the model affect individual
and aggregate outcomes. In the next few paragraphs we discuss our main results.
We start our analysis of stability by defining Nash stable networks. We show that the
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Nash stable network is, generically, the complete network in which players exert the same
effort in all contests.1 The Nash stable network is complete, even though every player
would prefer not to be engaged in any of her contests. The reason is the coordination
problem when two players contemplate destroying the link between them. For any contest
in the complete network, both players would be better off if they destroyed the link
between them. However, if one player unilaterally deviates and chooses investment 0, the
other player is strictly better off if she invests a non-zero effort in the contest between
them. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations - and thus a strong
pairwise stable network (Bloch and Dutta, 2009) generically does not exist.2
The lack of forward looking is implied when using the Nash equilibrium as a stability
concept. Starting a contest is always a profitable action for a player because she does
not take into account that the new opponent will fight back. We consider an alternative
stability concept where we relax this assumption and allow limited forward looking. We
assume that a player, when forming a link, takes into account that the new opponent will
fight back. However, we still assume that players do not take into account further adjust-
ments in other players’ strategies that may be a consequence of the new link creation. In
that sense, players are limited farsighted. We define a limited farsighted pairwise stable
network (LFPS) as a network that is immune to both unilateral and bilateral deviations
of limited farsighted players.
The limited farsightedness assumption provides tractability, and we believe it is also
sensible. Indeed, calculating all the effects of a change in the network structure on the
equilibrium investment profiles is a highly nonlinear problem even when the number of
nodes in the network is small. Assuming that players are able to make these calculations,
for any contemplated choice of opponents and efforts, would be a very strong assumption
about their cognitive abilities. Moreover, recent experimental results suggest that, even
in a simple bilateral Tullock contest game, players find it very difficult to anticipate oppo-
nents’ best responses to their actions. Furthermore, even when the action of an opponent
is known, they fail to calculate their own best response correctly (Masiliunas et al., 2014).
In (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016) authors find evidence in favor of the limited farsightedness
in an experimental investigation of much simpler network formation games.
We show that in every LFPS non-empty network, players are partitioned in M ≥ 2
partitions of unequal sizes. Members of the same partition do not have links with each
other, but have links with all other players in the network. So, even though players
are ex-ante homogeneous, a stable non-empty network is necessarily asymmetric. To
understand this result, the concept of a player’s strength is useful. In the model, a player
is strong when her opponents are weak. Thus, the strength of a player can be seen
1The empty network is Nash stable, for instance, in the case when the marginal cost of effort, for
any level of effort, is so high that a non-zero investment against an opponent who invests 0 is still not
profitable. We explicitly state this condition in Proposition 7.
2The empty network is immune to bilateral deviations.
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as a recursive measure of her position in the contest network. In the model, a strong
player3 has an incentive to form a link with a weak player, provided that the difference
in their strengths is large enough. This is because it is cheaper to win a contest against a
weak player than against a strong player. As the number of opponents of a weak player
increases, she becomes relatively weaker and therefore a more attractive opponent for
other strong players. This mechanism leads to network configurations with three types
of players in a stable network. The strongest players in the society (attackers) win all of
their contests. Hybrid type players are strong enough to win against the weakest players,
but are, at the same time, weak enough to be attractive opponents for the strongest
players. The weakest players are victims. They lose all of their contests. We find that
there will always be a single class of attackers and a single class of victims in a stable
non-empty network. The remaining M − 2 classes, if they exist, are classes of hybrids.
There are no links between the members of the same class in a LFPS network, whereas
there is a link between any two players from different classes. The class of attackers is
the largest class, while the class of victims is the smallest class.
Finally, we examine how the level of inefficiency in a stable network, as measured
by the total contest (wasteful) spending, depends on the parameters of the model. We
mention a few interesting results. When the stable network is asymmetric enough, an
increase in the likelihood of a draw (i.e. a third party mediation intervention) may
actually lead to an increase in the overall contest spending. On the other hand, when
the network is not very asymmetric, an increase in the likelihood of a draw will always
lead to a decrease in the contest spending. We also describe how an idiosyncratic cost
shock (i.e. a third party intervention affecting only one player in the network) propagates
through the network, and affects the investments of other players.
1.1 Related work
Our paper contributes to the literature of weighted network formation in which players
choose their investment levels specifically for each link. Several other papers study net-
work formation with link-specific actions. (Goyal et al., 2008) studies the formation of
R&D networks between firms that also compete in a market. (Bloch and Dutta, 2009)
and the follow-up work by (Dero¨ıan, 2009) study a model of network formation in which
agents choose how much to invest in each of their communication links. (Baumann,
2017) develops a model of friendship formation in which players choose how much time
to devote to socializing with each of their friends, and how much time to spend alone.
All of these papers consider a bilateral interaction which is directly beneficial to both
parties (i.e. collaboration, communication, socializing). Our model deals with a qualita-
tively different type of interactions - contests. Moreover, in the above mentioned papers,
neighbors’ actions are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. In the model
3Strength is an endogenous concept in our model, and it is a function of the global network structure.
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presented in this paper, neighbors’ actions are neither strategic substitutes nor strategic
complements.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on contests. Studying contests has a
long tradition in economics, starting from seminal works on rent seeking (Tullock, 1967),
and lobbying (Krueger, 1974). A recent comprehensive review of the literature on con-
tests can be found in (Corcho´n and Serena, 2018). This literature is mostly concerned
with the analysis of n-lateral contest games. In this paper, we consider an environment
in which a population of players plays interrelated bilateral contests. We model the
bilateral contest game following (Nti, 1997, Amegashie, 2006) and (Blavatskyy, 2010).
Since, in our model, the transfer size does not depend on the number of opponents
(same as in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015)), our model captures the situations in which the
prize is relational. For instance, this is may be the case in lobbying (Hillman and Riley,
1989), appropriation of property rights (MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013), and litigation
(Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). In this paper we show that accounting for the network
structure of bilateral contests when studying the effects of changes in the parameters of
the model on the equilibrium outcomes (as done in (Nti, 1997) for example), may lead to
qualitatively different results compared to the case when the network structure is ignored.
The importance of the structure of a contest network has recently been acknowledged
in the literature, both theoretically and empirically. There are several papers that study
contests on a given network. (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) develops a model in which
players play bilateral contests with their neighbors in a given network. (Dziubin´ski et al.,
2016) studies a model in which the network of connections between players determines
potential conflicts, and agents sequentially choose if they wish to start a conflict with
their neighbors and the effort level they are going to exert. (Ko¨nig et al., 2017) studies
a model of conflict on a given network with two types of links: enmity links and alliance
links. All agents participate in a single n-lateral contest and the network structure is
built in the payoff function. They also conduct an econometric analysis using data on
the Second Congo War, and find that there are significant fighting externalities across
contests. (Matros and Rietzke, 2018) studies a model in which there are two types of
nodes: players and contests contests. Players connected to the same contest play an
n-lateral contest game. None of these models consider network formation. The model in
this paper endogenizes the network structure in the model of (Franke and Ozturk, 2015),
and provides new comparative static results.
There are a few papers that are concerned with formation of contest networks. (Jackson and Nei,
2015) studies the impact of trade on the formation of interstate alliances and on the onset
of war. They show that trade can mitigate conflict. (Grandjean et al., 2017) studies a
network formation model in which agents form a network of collaboration links and then
engage in a single n-lateral contest. The position of a player in the collaboration network
determines her valuation of the contest prize. The closest paper to ours is (Hiller, 2016),
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which develops a model of network formation in which players form positive links (friend-
ship) and negative links (enmity). A negative link indicates that players are involved in
a contest. However, in (Hiller, 2016) players do not choose the fighting effort like they
do in our model, and therefore the model in (Hiller, 2016) is not a model of weighted
network formation. (Goyal et al., 2016) provides a comprehensive review of the literature
on conflict and networks.
The rest of the paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 2 lays out the model. In Sec-
tion 3 we characterize efficient and LFPS networks. In Section 4 we present comparative
static results. Section 5 provides a characterization of Nash stable networks and strongly
pairwise stable networks. We conclude in Section 6. All the proofs are given in Appendix
A.
2 Model
In this section we describe our network formation model. In the next paragraph we
informally summarize the model. In Subsection 2.1 we formally introduce the notion of
a contest network, and describe the model. In Subsection 2.2 we define the concepts of
stability and efficiency we use in this paper.
Informally, we consider a population composed of a finite number of ex-ante identical
players. Players can engage in bilateral contests. The outcome of a contest is probabilistic,
and depends on costly investments by both parties. The prize of the contest is a fixed
transfer from the defeated to the victor. Individuals choose both with whom to engage in
a contest and how much to invest in each of their contests. We are interested in stable and
efficient social structures that arise from this type of interaction, and how the structure
of a stable contest network mediates the effects of various types of shocks and third party
interventions.
2.1 Setup
Denote with N = {1, 2, ..., n} the set of players. Each player i ∈ N chooses how much
to invest in bilateral contests with other players. Strategy of player i is vector si =
(si1, si2, ..., si,i−1, si,i+1, ..., sin) ∈ Rn−1≥0 , where sij denotes the investment of player i in
bilateral contest with j.
The expected payoff of a bilateral contest between players i and j, πij(sij , sji), is
defined by:
πij(sij, sji; r) =
φ(sij)
φ(sij) + φ(sji) + r
− φ(sji)
φ(sij) + φ(sji) + r
. (1)
The expression
φ(sij)
φ(sij)+φ(sji)+r
∈ [0, 1] determines the probability with which i wins the
transfer T = 1 from j, and it defines the Contest Success Function (CSF) F : R2≥0 → [0, 1].
The specific form of CSF we use in this paper is introduced in (Nti, 1997). The technology
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function φ : R≥0 → R≥0 in (1) transforms the investment in the contest (i.e. money, effort)
into actual means of fighting (i.e. guns, lawyers). We assume that φ is: (i) continuous and
twice differentiable, (ii) strictly increasing and weakly concave, and (iii) φ(0) = 0. Point
(ii) imposes non-increasing returns to scale, and (iii) guarantees that zero investment
implies zero actual means of fighting. The parameter r ≥ 0 captures the likelihood of
a draw (there is no transfer between players in the event of a draw). There are many
situations in which contests can end without a winner. For instance, a litigation can end
in a mistrial, sport contests often end in a tie, etc. Alternatively, one can interpret r as
noise in a transferable contest, using CSF proposed in (Blavatskyy, 2010) and modeling
noise as in (Amegashie, 2006). In this paper we refer to r simply as the likelihood of
a draw.4 A comprehensive review of contest models that allow ties can be found in
(Corcho´n and Serena, 2018). The CSF used in (1) is fairly general, and includes CSFs
studied in (Tullock, 1980, Loury, 1979, Dixit, 1987) as special cases. In particular, by
setting φ to be identity mapping and r = 0 we get the CSF used in (Franke and Ozturk,
2015).
We say that there is a contest between two players, i and j, whenever sij + sji >
0. Players i and j are said to be connected when there is a contest between them.
Therefore, strategy profile s defines (induces) weighted and non-directed network g(s).
Weight sij + sji is assigned to link ij = ji.
5 When i and j are connected we write ij ∈ g.
It is clear that different strategy profiles s can induce the same weighted network. In
this paper we use the terms link and contest as synonyms when talking about network
g(s). We will use Ni to denote the neighborhood of node i, so Ni = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g}, and
di = |Ni| to denote the degree of node i. The expected payoff of agent i from network
g(s) is defined by:
πi(g(s)) =
∑
j∈Ni
πij(sij, sji; r)− c(wi), (2)
where
wi =
∑
j∈Ni
sij
is the total investment of player i in all of her contests. Function c : R≥0 → R≥0 is the
cost function that we assume to be continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly convex, with c(0) = 0.
We conclude this section by specifying what it means to form or destroy a link.
Consider strategy profile s. Suppose that strategies si and sj are such that sij = sji = 0.
This means ij /∈ g(s). We say that player i starts a contest with j or that i forms link
ij, when i deviates from strategy si to strategy sˆi such that sˆij > 0. If, strategies si and
sj are such that sij+ sji > 0, and after a (potentially bilateral) deviation of players i and
4For other interpretations of r see (Nti, 1997).
5To simplify notation, we omit dependence on s whenever there is no danger of ambiguity.
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j to strategies sˆi and sˆj, we have sˆij + sˆji = 0, we say that players i and j ended contest
ij or deleted link ij.
2.2 Efficiency and stability
In this subsection we first define efficient networks. Then we introduce the concepts of
network stability which we employ in this paper. We define Nash stable networks, and
point out why using this standard equilibrium notion may be inadequate for the model we
study. Finally, we introduce limited farsighted pairwise stability (LFPS), which circum-
vents the shortcomings of Nash stability while still allowing for a reasonable tractability in
the analysis. In Section 5 we discuss how LFPS relates to other stability concepts usually
employed when stuyding the formation of weighted networks, namely Nash stability and
strong pairwise stability (Bloch and Dutta, 2009). We also provide a characterization of
Nash stable networks and strongly pairwise stable networks.
Define the value of network g(s) with:
V (g(s)) =
n∑
i=1
πi(g(s)). (3)
We say that network g(s) is efficient if it is a maximizer of the value function V .
Definition 1
Network g(s) is efficient if V (g(s)) ≥ V (g(s′)) for any s′.
We define Nash stable networks as in (Bloch and Dutta, 2009, Definition 2):
Definition 2 (Nash stable networks)
A network g(s) is Nash stable if there is no individual i and strategy s′i such that
πi (g(s
′
i, s−i)) > πi (g(s)) .
So, a network g(s) is Nash stable if no player can alter her investment pattern and
obtain a higher payoff. The Nash equilibrium may not be the most suitable stability
concept for our model. There are at least two reasons for this. First, we show that
starting a contest is profitable for any player, except in extreme cases.6 Thus, a deviation
which leads to the formation of a new link is always profitable. Second, a deviation which
results in the destruction of a link is never profitable. The former is a consequence of the
lack of forward looking when starting a contest. When players are not farsighted, they
do not take into account that the opponent will fight back. The latter is a consequence of
the fact that Nash stability deals only with unilateral deviations. We discuss these points
in more detail in Section 5, where we provide a characterization of Nash stable networks
in Proposition 7.
6See Section 5 for more details.
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To address the issues pointed out in the previous paragraph, we consider a model in
which (i) we assume that when i decides to form a link with j, she takes into account the
immediate reaction from j (i.e. anticipates that j will fight back), and (ii) we allow for
bilateral deviations of players. In the following paragraphs we discuss (i) in more detail.
Models of network formation usually assume either pure myopia or complete farsight-
edness (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016). In our model, pure myopia implies that starting a
contest is always profitable. Given the complexity of the network effects, full farsight-
edness is too strong of an assumption to make. Indeed, even for networks with a small
number of nodes, solving for the equilibrium requires finding the roots of a high order
polynomial. Thus, calculating all future adjustments in other players’ strategies after
a deviation is computationally extremely demanding. Moreover, experimental results
suggest that limited farsightedness may be the most accurate way to describe players’
behavior in network formation games (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016). In this paper we adopt
a specific form of limited farsightedness, described in the next paragraph.
Consider strategy profile s. Let Fi = {j ∈ N | ij /∈ g}. Thus, Fi is the set of players
with whom player i does not have a contest. Consider a situation in which i contemplates
initiating contests with players j ∈ Li ⊆ Fi. We assume that, when assessing the payoff
of starting contest ij with action sij , player i expects that j will fight back by choosing
the best response BR(sij), given j
′s current contest investments sj. This means that,
when i forms links to players from set Li by deviating from si to s
′
i, her expected payoff
is πi (g(s
′
i, sˆLi , s−i−Li)) where sˆLi = (sˆj)j∈Li is such that for each j ∈ Li:
πj (g(s
′
i, sˆj, sLi−j , s−i−Li)) ≥ πj
(
g(s′i, sˆ
′
j , sLi−j, s−i−Li)
)
, (4)
for each sˆ′j with sˆ
′
jk = sˆjk = sjk for k 6= i. Here we use −i − Li to denote all players,
except i and players from Li. We write Li − j to denote players in Li except player j.
We are now ready to state the stability concept we use in this paper.
Definition 3 (Limited Farsighted Pairwise Stable Networks)
Weighted network g = g(s∗) is stable if conditions (U) and (B) hold.
(U) For any player i ∈ N , and any, potentially empty, set Li ⊆ Fi, and any strategy
si ∈ Rn−1≥0 ,
πi (g(s
∗)) ≥ πi
(
g
(
si, sˆLi, s
∗
−i−Li
))
.
(B) For any pair of players (i, j) such that ij ∈ g(s∗), any two sets Li ⊆ Fi and Lj ⊆ Fj,
and any two strategies si and sj such that ij /∈ g(si, sj, s∗−i−j),
πi(g(si, sj , sˆLi , s
∗
−i−j−Li
) ≥ πi(g(s∗))⇒ πj(g(sj , si, sˆLj , s∗−j−i−Lj) < πj(g(s∗)).
Part (U) of Definition 3 states that no player i ∈ N has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate and change her pattern of contest investments. The important assumption there
9
is that if the deviation entails the onset of a contest with player j, player i takes into
account that j may fight back, as discussed in the paragraph preceeding equation (4). Part
(B) of Definition 3 states no two players find it profitable to jointly deviate by deleting
the link between them, while at the same time potentially adjusting their strategies in
other contests or forming new links. In part, the motivation for the equilibrium concept
in Definition 3 is dynamic. In online Appendix B we propose a process of network
formation which rests in equilibria as defined in Definition 3. In Section 5 we discuss how
LFPS relates to other stability concepts employed in the literature on weighted network
formation.
It is clear that, in order to start a contest (create a link), the action of one party
suffices. This is a natural property, since, for instance, to start a litigation process it is
sufficient that one side files a lawsuit. On the other hand, to end contest ij, both players
i and j must choose zero investment. In other words, to make peace, both sides must
choose not to fight. Therefore, in our model, the creation of a link is the result of an
unilateral action, while the destruction of a link is a result of a bilateral action.
3 Analysis
In this section we first outline some properties of the network formation game. Then we
show that the unique efficient network is the empty network. This is not surprising, given
the negative sum nature of the bilateral contest game. We then turn our attention to
the analysis of stable networks. We state and discuss a series of important intermediate
results that lead to one of the main results of this paper - a LFPS network must be a
completeM-partite graph with partitions of different sizes. We then provide the sufficient
and necessary conditions for stability when M = 2.
3.1 Preliminary considerations
We begin our analysis by outlining the properties of the payoff function and the nature
of strategic interactions. It is straightforward to verify that the payoff function (2) of
player i is increasing and concave in si, and decreasing and convex in s−i. The sign of the
first and the sign of the second derivative of the payoff function with respect to r depend
on si and s−i. When a player’s probability of winning is greater than the probability of
losing in all contests, the payoff function will be decreasing and convex in r. Similarly,
if the probability of winning is lower than the probability of losing in all of her contests,
the payoff function is increasing and concave in r.7 The best reply curves of the bilateral
contest game are nonlinear and non-monotonic. The bilateral contest game is neither a
game of strategic complements nor strategic substitutes. To the best of our knowledge,
7When r = 0 the payoff function is not defined at the point sij = sji = 0, however, this does not
affect our results.
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the only papers that consider this type of bilateral strategic interactions on networks are
(Franke and Ozturk, 2015) and (Bourle`s et al., 2017). Neither of these papers studies
network formation.
3.2 Efficient Networks
We briefly discuss the efficient network structure. It is easy to show that the unique
network structure which maximizes the total utility of the society is the empty network.
This is a direct consequence of the transferable nature of the contest game and the fact
that effort is costly. Indeed, the total payoff that society obtains from network g(s) can
be expressed as:
V (g(s)) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
(
φ(sij)− φ(sji)
φ(sij) + φ(sji) + r
− c(wi)
)
= −
∑
i∈N
c(wi).
In Section 4 we discuss the welfare properties of stable networks. Since contest spend-
ing is wasteful, we focus on the total contest investment as a measure of the inefficiency
associated with a stable network. We discuss how this measure behaves when we vary
the parameters of the model, and how this depends on the structure of the stable contest
network.
3.3 Stable networks
In this section we identify LFPS network architectures. We start with some useful ob-
servations, and then through a series of intermediate results arrive at our main result in
this section - a description of stable networks. We show that a non-empty stable network
must be connected, and must have a complete M-partite structure. We describe Nash
stable networks and strongly pairwise stable networks in Section 5.
Under structure of contest network g(s) we think of unweighted network (N, g¯) with
the set of nodes N and the set of links g¯ ⊆ {{i, j} : i ∈ N ∧ j ∈ N} such that ij ∈ g¯
if and only if ij ∈ g(s). In this paper we will always use g¯ to denote unweighted and
undirected network, and g = g(s) to denote the weighted contest network.
As hinted in Section 2.1, there are infinitely many strategy profiles s∗ that result in
the same network structure. The first result we present in this paper is that any stable
network structure is induced by one and only one strategy profile s.
Proposition 1
Let g(s∗) be a LFPS network. If g(s′) is a LFPS and such that ij ∈ g(s′) if and only if
ij ∈ g(s∗) then s′ = s∗. If additionally φ′(0) = ∞, then s∗ij > 0 and s∗ji > 0 whenever
ij ∈ g(s∗). In special case: φ(x) = x and c(x) = αx2, inequalities s∗ij > 0 and s∗ji > 0
hold when r is small enough.
For simplicity, additional to the assumptions stated in Section 2.1, in the remaining
part of Section 3 and in Section 4 we will require that φ′(0) =∞. For some results in these
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sections we will focus on the special case with φ(x) = x and c(x) = αx2, α > 0, which
will be explicitly stated. Then we will also assume r → 0. This additional assumption
simply guarantees that whenever there is a contest ij, both players will invest non-zero
amount of resources in fighting.
Proposition 1 states that if g(s∗) is a LFPS network then there does not exist another
a LFPS network g(s′) such that s∗ 6= s′ with the property that ij ∈ g(s∗)⇔ ij ∈ g(s′).
Hence, without ambiguity, we can talk about LFPS stability of unweighted and undirected
network g¯.
Definition 4
Unweighted and undirected network g¯ = (N, g¯) is said to be stable when there exists a
strategy profile s such that g(s) is LFPS, and ij ∈ g(s)⇔ ij ∈ g¯.
It is clear from Proposition 1 that stable g¯ can be induced with one and only one
strategy profile s∗.
We now define the strength of a player in a stable network.
Definition 5
Consider stable network g = g(s∗). Player i ∈ N is said to be stronger than player j ∈ N
in g whenever w∗i < w
∗
j .
Definition 5 is motivated with the result that for two players i and j, such that
ij ∈ g(s∗) and g(s∗) is LFPS, i wins contest ij whenever w∗i < w∗j . We state and prove
this result formally in Proposition 10 in Appendix A.8 This seemingly counter-intuitive
result is a direct consequence of the convexity of the cost function - when w∗i is high, the
resources are more costly at the margin.
We now introduce a useful way to partition players in a stable network with respect
to their strengths. Sort (w∗i )i∈N starting from the lowest (w
∗
1 < w
∗
2 < ... < w
∗
M), where
M ≤ n is the number of different total equilibrium investment levels. We use Wi to
denote the class of players that have the i-th lowest total investment level, and with |Wi|
the cardinality of class i.
Definition 6
Player a ∈ Wi is an attacker if all of her contests are with agents from W i = {Wj |j > i}.
Player a ∈ Wi is a hybrid if there exist players b and c such that ab, ac ∈ g and w∗b >
w∗a > w
∗
c . Player a ∈ Wi is a victim if she has all of her contests with players from
W i = {Wj|j < i}.
Definition 6 acknowledges the fact that a contest between two players of the same
strength is not profitable to any of the players involved, and hence cannot be part of a
stable network.
8This result, in the context of the game on a fixed network, appears in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015,
Proposition 2) for the case when r = 0, φ(x) = x and c(x) = x2.
12
If j is weaker than i in stable network g(s∗) and ij ∈ g(s∗), there exists a bilateral
deviation which is profitable for j in which i and j destroy link ij. This is simply because
j loses the contest ij and thus prefers not to engage in it (see Proposition 10 in Appendix
A). Therefore, we say that i controls link ij if i is stronger than j. This in particular
implies that in a stable network every attacker must receive a positive payoff. If this were
not true for some attacker i and contest ij, then a joint deviation in which i and j choose
sij = sji = 0 (delete link ij) would be profitable for both i and j.
In order to study the network formation, it is important to be able to compare contests
in the network. We now state a result which enables us to do that.
Proposition 2
Let g(s∗) be a LFPS network. Suppose a ∈ Wi, b ∈ Wj , c ∈ Wk such that i < j < k and
ab ∈ g, ac ∈ g, bc ∈ g. Then s∗ab > s∗ac, s∗ba > s∗ca, s∗ca < s∗cb and s∗ac > s∗bc.
Proposition 2 states that a strong player which is engaged in contests with two players
spends less, and has a less intensive contest with the weaker of the two opponents.
Our first intermediate result is that g(s) cannot be stable if for some player i and two
players j and k, such that wi < wj ≤ wk we have ij ∈ g(s) and ik /∈ g(s). If this were the
case, a bilateral deviation in which i and j destroy link ij, and i forms link ik, would be
profitable for both i and j. Intuitively, a strong player prefers to have contests with the
weakest players in the network.9 A consequence of this result is that a non-empty stable
network g must be connected. Indeed, if there are two components in the stable network
g, then there must be at least one attacker that is not connected to the weakest player
in the network. This will be an attacker that does not belong to the same component as
the weakest player in the network. We state this result as Corollary 2 in Appendix A. In
the rest of the paper we focus on connected networks.
We now discuss, in turn, some properties of classes of attackers, hybrids and victims
in a stable network. We begin by arguing that all members of the same class of attackers
must have the same neighborhood in a stable network. Then we show that there can
be only one class of attackers in a stable network, and that members of this class are
connected to all other players in the network, except to the members of their own class.
In the next two paragraphs we outline the main intuition behind these results.
If attackers i and j from the same class W in stable network g(s∗) have different
neighborhoods (Ni 6= Nj), it cannot be that Ni ⊂ Nj nor Nj ⊂ Ni. If this were true,
w∗i and w
∗
j would not be the same, hence i and j would not belong to the same class.
10
Moreover, together with Ni 6= Nj , this implies that there exists k ∈ Ni \ (Ni ∩ Nj). If k
is stronger than every neighbor of player j, then there exists h ∈ Nj \Ni which is weaker
9See Lemma 1 in Appendix A for the formal statement and the proof.
10In Corollary 1 in Appendix A we show that the strength of a player decreases with her neighborhood,
with respect to the set inclusion.
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than k. As we argued earlier in this section, in this case there is a profitable deviation
in which ik is destroyed, and ih is formed. If k is not stronger than every neighbor of
j, there is an analogous profitable deviation for j. The incentive to start contests with
weak players in the network is the main mechanism at work.
To show that there is only one class of attackers, we consider two representative
players from two different classes of attackers, i ∈ Wℓ and j ∈ Wm. We first show that in
a stable network it cannot be that Ni ⊂ Nj . Indeed, if this were the case, then w∗j ≥ w∗i .
Furthermore, if j does have an incentive to break any of her links (so all contests with
Nj \Ni are profitable for j), i will have an incentive to form links with all players Nj \Ni.
This is the case because after such a deviation players from Nj \ Ni will become even
weaker, and since i is stronger than j, each of the newly formed links will increase i’s
expected payoff.11 If neighborhoods of i and j are not nested, the argument proceeds
analogously to the discussion in the previous paragraph. Furthemore, all members of the
unique class of attackers W1 are connected to all nodes in a stable network that do not
belong to W1. For the formal statement and the proof see Lemma 4 in Appendix A.
We now turn our attention to the classes of hybrids and victims. We find that, in
a stable network, all members of the same class of hybrids must have the same neigh-
borhood. To show this, we first partition the neighborhood of a hybrid player into two
sets: the set of stronger opponents and the set of weaker opponents. To be more precise,
consider LFPS network g. Let N¯i = {j ∈ Ni ∧ w∗j < w∗i } and ¯Ni = {j ∈ Ni ∧ w
∗
j ≥ w∗i },
and refer to these sets as the strong neighborhood of i and the weak neighborhood of i
respectively. Consider now the strongest class of hybrids, W2. As we have seen before, all
members ofW2 must be connected to every member ofW1. This means that all members
of W2 have the same strong neighborhood. To show that they also have the same weak
neighborhood, we use the same argument we have used when arguing that attackers have
the same neighborhood. Proceeding analogously, we show that the claim holds for mem-
bers of all other hybrid classes Wk : 2 ≤ k ≤ K. We formalize this intuition in Lemma 5
in Appendix A.
Since there is a finite number of players, there exists the weakest player in a stable
network (not necessarily just one player). From Lemma 1 we know that a player who
wins at least one contest must be connected to the weakest players in the network. This,
in particular, holds for the weakest class of hybrids. Players that are not connected to the
weakest players must be the weakest players themselves. The set of the weakest players
in the network constitutes the class of victims.
So far we have argued that in a non-empty stable network we can partition players
into M < n classes with respect to their strength. There is only one class of attackers
and only one class of victims. The remaining M −2 classes, provided that they exist, are
classes of hybrids of different strength. Each player i ∈ Wℓ is in a contest with all players
11For the formal statement and proof see Lemma 3 in Appendix A.
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outside Wℓ. This means that a stable network must have a complete M-partite structure.
We are now ready to state the main result about LFPS networks, which follows directly
from the intermediate results discussed above.
Proposition 3
A non-empty stable network g(s∗) has a completeM-partite network structure with |Wk| >
|Wk+1| ∀k ∈ {1, ...,M − 1}. The empty network is stable.
It is clear that not all complete M-partite networks with property |Wk| > |Wk+1|
are stable. The difference in strengths, and consequently in the class sizes, must be at
least large enough to ensure that every bilateral contest in the network is profitable for
the stronger opponent. For the sake of simplicity, we discuss this issue focusing on the
particular class of networks from Proposition 3 with M = 2. For the remaining part
of this section, and Section 4we assume that φ(x) = x and c(x) = αx2, with α > 0,
and r > 0 is small enough such that each s∗ij > 0 and s
∗
ji > 0 for each ij ∈ g(s∗) (see
Proposition 1). We denote two partitions by A and V , and the sizes of those partitions by
a and v respectively. Class A is the class of attackers, and class V is the class of victims.
We use Ka,v to denote a complete (unweighted) bipartite network with partitions of sizes
a and v. We keep the number of players in the population fixed (a+v = n). The following
proposition holds.
Proposition 4
Consider population with n players. There exists v∗ such that complete bipartite network
Ka,v = Kn−v,v is LFPS only when v < v
∗.
We first show is a unique strategy profile s such that condition (U) from Definition
3 holds, and that g(s) has complete bipartite network structure Kn−v,v. Then we show
that there exists v∗ such that g(s) also satisfies condition (B) from Definition 3 only when
v < v∗. To understand the intuition, it is illustrative to think about how the payoff of an
attacker i ∈ A behaves when we move from g(s) which is Ka,v to g(s′) which is Ka−1,v+1.
There are two effects on πi. A higher v means that there are more contests. This means
that the amount of resources that can be appropriated increases which is beneficial for
i ∈ A, but at the same time the number of opponents of i ∈ A increases, and therefore it is
more difficult for i to defend herself. The trade-off between these two effects is illustrated
in Figure 1. The net effect depends on the size of v in a nonlinear way - for a small v the
first effect dominates, while for higher values of v the second effect dominates. Similar
reasoning holds when i ∈ A contemplates to end the contest with j ∈ V . After deleting
ij, i can relocate some of the freed resources in her other contests, and earn a higher
payoff from the remaining contests. On the other hand, i will be involved in a smaller
number of contests, and therefore the maximal amount of resources she can extract will
decrease. Note that j ∈ V always prefers to delete the link with i ∈ A.
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Figure 1: The payoff of i ∈ A for fixed n = 50 when v varies and players play the unique
s consistent with (U). r = 0, c(x) = x2, and φ(x) = x.
4 Comparative statics
In this section we are primarily interested in the inefficiencies associated with stable
networks. We focus on the total wasteful spending w∗ =
∑
i w
∗
i . We analyze the effects
of small changes in the parameters of the model on w∗ and s∗ while keeping the network
structure fixed, and the role of the network structure in mediating the propagation of
small shocks hitting a player in the network. We start by analyzing how changes in the
likelihood of a draw, the marginal cost, and transfer size affect w∗. Not surprisingly, we
find that when the effort becomes less expensive at the margin for all players, or when
the transfer T increases in all contests, w∗ increases. Interestingly, when the likelihood of
a draw r increases, the total spending in the equilibrium may both increase and decrease.
The direction of the effect crucially depends on how asymmetric the stable network is,
and on the value of r. The following proposition summarizes these comparative static
findings:
Proposition 5
Let φ(x) = x and c(x) = αx2. Let Ka,v : v < a be a stable network, then:
1. w∗ decreases with α, and increases with transfer size T .
2. w∗ may both increase and decrease with r. When r → 0 w∗ will increase in r when
a > 37v.
The non-monotonic effect of a change in r on w∗ is a consequence of the non-
monotonicity of the best reply function in r. When r is small enough, the best reply
function of i ∈ A, BRi(·), will be increasing in r as long as BRi(sji; r) > 3sji+ r. There-
fore, a priori it is not clear if an increase in r will result in an increase or a decrease in
the equilibrium spending per contest. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 depicts the best
response curves for a contest ij ∈ Ka,v when r changes from 0 to 0.05. The left panel is
the plot for K4,1. In this case the change r from 0 to 0.05 will lead to the new equilibrium
(intersection of dotted lines) in which both i ∈ A and j ∈ V spend less, and therefore the
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intensity of contest ij decreases. The situation is different on the right panel, where we
consider the effect of the same change but for K40,1. In this case, in the new equilibrium
i invests more, and the intensity of each contest ij is larger when r = 0.05 than when
r = 0.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium for r = 0 and r = 0.05. i ∈ A and j ∈ V . When Ka,1 is stable
then s∗ji = s
∗
jk and s
∗
ij = s
∗
kj, k ∈ A.
When r increases, keeping the contest efforts fixed, the probability of losing for weak
players (members of V ) decreases. Since weak players already have a high marginal
cost of spending at their current total investment level, they will have an incentive to
decrease their spending. On the other hand, an increase in r will lead to a decrease in the
probability of winning for stronger players (members of A). When strong players’ total
effort is not high, this will lead to an increase in their per contest effort. An increase
in the investment of strong players will further increase the incentive of weak players to
spend less. What will be the final effect on w∗ depends on the relative magnitudes of the
two effects discussed above. In Figure 3 we consider network K200,1 in which an increase
in r can lead to an increase in w∗.
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effort
s ji
*
s ij
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w
*
.
Figure 3: Star network (a = 200, v = 1): Graph depicts the equilibrium efforts of the
center node i and the periphery node j in a single contest, and w∗, as functions of r.
The effects of changes in the likelihood of a draw on the equilibrium outcomes in con-
test games have been already studied in (Nti, 1997) and (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013).
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Both of these papers find that a decrease in the likelihood of a draw unambiguously leads
to an increase in the total equilibrium effort. The reason why we find qualitatively differ-
ent results is that we take into account asymmetries implied by the network structure. In
(Nti, 1997) the author studies symmetric n-lateral contests. In (Acemoglu and Jensen,
2013) the authors consider changes in r which are a positive shock to a player. When the
network is asymmetric enough, a decrease in r is a negative shock for weak players, and
positive shock for strong players. Hence, the results from (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013)
cannot be applied.
In Proposition 5 we have considered changes that simultaneously affect all players in
the network. Now we discuss the effects of a change that affects only one player. We
contemplate a scenario in which the cost function of player k for an exogenous reason
changes to ck = (α + ǫk)x
2. We will refer to this change as the cost shock hitting player
k.12 in case of conflict, for instance, the shock can be a third party intervention which
makes it more costly for a party to acquire weapons. We are interested to see how s∗
and w∗ change in response to the shock, and how this depends on the structure of the
network. We focus on small shocks, ǫk → 0. As before, we focus on stable Ka,v. To
answer this question we note that the total equilibrium spending is implicitly defined
with a system of equations (5), where di denotes the degree of node i (see Lemma 8 in
Appendix A).
w∗k =
∑
j∈Nk
αw∗j
(αw∗j + (α + ǫk)w
∗
k)
2
− dk r
2
,
w∗i =
∑
j∈Ni,j 6=k
αw∗j
(αw∗j + αw
∗
i )
2
+
(α + ǫk)w
∗
k
(αw∗i + (α + ǫk)w
∗
k)
2
1ik∈g − di r
2
, i 6= k.
(5)
System (5) provides the expression for the strength of player i as a function of the
strengths of her neighbors. It is interesting to note that, even though the actions of a
player are link-specific, the equilibrium payoff of a player can be expressed as a function
of her total equilibrium spending (see Lemma 8 in Appendix A). Taking derivatives of
(5) with respect to ǫk and solving for
∂w∗i
∂ǫk
, i ∈ N we get the following result:
Proposition 6
Let Ka,v be a stable network. Suppose player k experiences a cost shock.
(i) If k ∈ A then ∂w∗k
∂ǫk
< 0,
∂w∗i
∂ǫk
< 0 i ∈ A, i 6= k, and ∂w∗j
∂ǫk
> 0, j ∈ V . If k ∈ V then
∂w∗
k
∂ǫk
< 0,
∂w∗j
∂ǫk
< 0 j ∈ V, j 6= k, and ∂w∗i
∂ǫk
< 0, i ∈ A.
(ii)
∂w∗
∂ǫk
< 0, k ∈ N.
12Other types of small shocks can be studied using the same approach.
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To understand (i) from Proposition 6, notice that, when k ∈ A, the direct effect of the
shock hitting k will be that k will decrease her contest investment w∗k. Because members
of V are weaker than k, their effort in contests with k will increase. At the same time,
they will decrease their investment in contests with other players from A. When k ∈ V ,
the direct effect of the shock will again cause a decrease in w∗k. Since all opponents of
k are stronger than k, they will also decrease their investment in contests with k, but
will increase their investment in contests with other members of V . This will, in turn,
lead to a decrease in the total equilibrium effort of other members of V . This result is a
consequence of the network structure of interactions, and the property of the best reply
function, which increases with the effort of a weaker opponent and decreases with the
effort of a stronger opponent. Even though some players may spend more in contests
after the shock, w∗ still decreases after the shock.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the relation between LFPS and other concepts of stability
used in the analysis of the formation of weighted networks. We point out some is-
sues when these equilibrium concepts are applied to the formation of contest networks,
and argue that LFPS addresses some of these issues. Two stability concepts employed
in the literature on weighted network formation are: the Nash stability (Rogers, 2006,
Bloch and Dutta, 2009, Baumann, 2017), and the strong pairwise stability (Bloch and Dutta,
2009, Baumann, 2017). In this section we do not rely on the additional assumption stated
in Section 3.3 that φ′(0) =∞ or that, in case when φ(x) = x, we have r → 0.
We first discuss Nash stable networks in our model (Definition 2). In case when, at
zero investment level, the marginal benefit of investing in a contest against player who
does not defend herself is greater than the marginal cost, the complete network will be
the only Nash stable network structure. Otherwise, the empty network is the only Nash
stable network structure. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 7
The Nash stable network is the empty network, when φ
′(0)
r
≤ c′(0). Otherwise the unique
Nash stable network g(s) is the complete network, with sij = sji > 0, ∀i, j ∈ N .
We note that the condition φ
′(0)
r
> c′(0) will be satisfied in the special case when φ
is the identity mapping and c is a quadratic function defined with c(x) = αx2, for any
finite r > 0 and α > 0.
Proposition 7 states that a non-empty Nash stable network is the complete network.
This is true even though no contest in the complete network is profitable for any player,
and any two players i and j would benefit from ending contest ij. However, the de-
struction of a link is never a profitable unilateral deviation. This is a consequence of a
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coordination problem which often arises in non-cooperative models of network formation
in which the link formation is a bilateral decision (Bloch and Dutta, 2009). In our model,
the link destruction is essentially a bilateral decision, which creates similar coordination
problem. To address this issue (Bloch and Dutta, 2009, Definition 3) introduces the con-
cept of strong pairwise stability, which considers both unilateral and bilateral deviations.
We show that a non-empty strongly pairwise stable contest network does not exist. To
see why, recall that the strong pairwise stability is a refinement of the Nash stability.
According to Proposition 7 the unique non-empty Nash stable network is the complete
network. In the complete network, each pair of players has an incentive to bilaterally de-
viate by destroying the link between them, since they have the same strength. Therefore,
the complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations.
Proposition 8
The strong pairwise stable network is the empty network if φ
′(0)
r
≤ c′(0). Otherwise, it
does not exist.
When initiating a contest, one may expect that a player takes into account that
the opponent will fight back. For instance, this is the case in litigation, lobbying, and
conflict. Therefore, in the definition of LFPS networks, we assume that a player takes
into account the expected effort that a new opponent will devote to this contest. In
particular, we assume that, when calculating the expected payoff of starting contest ij
with action sij, player i assumes that j will fight back by choosing the best response
sji = BR(sij), given j
′s current total spending wj. Thus, i is limited farsighted, since she
does not take into account further adjustments in investments that will take place in the
network once ij is formed. Since calculating all the adjustments in equilibrium strategies
when forming a link is equivalent to solving a highly nonlinear system of equations,
which is even numerically a very difficult problem, we believe that this is a reasonable
assumption. Experimental results suggest that in network formation games players are
limited farsighted (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016), even in models that are much simpler than
the model considered in this paper. Furthermore, experimental evidence indicates that
the difficulty in forming correct beliefs about the opponent’s best response may be one of
the main reasons behind the fact that in experiments subjects rarely play Nash strategies
in Tullock contest games (Masiliunas et al., 2014).
6 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge this is the first model of weighted network formation in
which the interaction between neighbors is an antagonistic one. Moreover, in the model,
actions of neighbors are neither strategic substitutes nor strategic complements. This
type of strategic interaction has not been considered in the literature on weighted network
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formation so far. In the paper, we describe efficient and stable networks using different
notions of stability. We also derive several comparative statics results illustrating the fact
that taking into account the structure of the contest network may lead to very different
results compared to cases when the network structure is ignored. We believe that the
qualitative insights of the model are applicable to many situations, including competitions
between divisions in companies, lobbying, and allocation of property rights.
There are several promising directions for further research . First, our model con-
siders only enmity links. It would be interesting to extend the model by allowing the
formation of weighted friendship links that imply positive spillovers (i.e. reduction of cost
of fighting), and see if this leads to different stable network configurations. Introducing
heterogeneity is a step which is necessary to make the model’s predictions empirically
testable. Heterogeneity in the effectiveness of the contest technology (function φ), cost
of fighting, and transfers can be directly included in the model. Furthermore, one could
consider a position in the network as a source of heterogeneity. For instance, we can
imagine that the amount of resources each enemy of a country expects to extract de-
creases with the number of opponents of that country. Finally, we focus on bilateral
contests. It would be interesting to study contest network formation allowing also for
multilateral contests. A starting point for this may be the model presented in this paper
and (Matros and Rietzke, 2018).
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Appendix A: Proofs
Contest Game on a Given Network
To understand the proofs in Appendix A, it is useful to revisit the case when the set contests
is exogeneously given and fixed. This is the case studied in Franke and Ozturk (2015). So, let
the set of possible contest in the society be defined with a binary, undirected network g¯. The
contest game on network g¯ is defined by:
C(g¯) = {N, {Si(g¯)}ni=1, {πi}ni=1}. (6)
In (6), N is the set of players, payoff functions πi are defined in (2), and the strategy space of
player i is given by:
Si(g¯) ≡ {si ∈ Rn−1≥0 : sij = 0 whenever ij /∈ g¯}.
The following proposition, which is a version of the existence and uniqueness result for the
contest game on a given network (Franke and Ozturk, 2015, Proposition 1 and Lemma 1), holds
as well when the payoff function are given with (2).
Proposition 9
For any binary network g¯, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game C(g¯),
s¯. The equilibrium s¯ is interior (s¯ij > 0 ∀ij ∈ g¯) if φ′(0) = ∞. When φ(x) = x and c(x) = x2
the equlibrium will be interior for r small enough.
Proof of Proposition 9.
Existence and Uniqueness. It is enough to follow the same steps as in the proof of
(Franke and Ozturk, 2015, Proposition 1 and Lemma 1) when the payoff function are given
with (2). The main part of the proof is showing that game C(g¯) is a concave game, as defined
in Rosen (1965), and then directly applying Rosen’s result.
Interiority. Assume that ij ∈ g¯, in the Nash equilibrium, s¯, of C(g¯), and that s¯ij =
0 ∨ s¯ji = 0. We show that when this logical disjunction is true, there is a profitable deviation
for either player i or player j. Hence, s¯ij = 0 ∨ s¯ji = 0 cannot be a part of the Nash
equilibrium of game C(g¯) when ij ∈ g¯. We consider the case when φ′(0) = ∞, and the case
φ(x) = x, c(x) = x2 separately.
Case 1: φ′(0) =∞.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that s¯ij = 0. There is a profitable deviation in which i
invests ǫ > 0 in contest with j. The marginal cost of this deviation c′(w¯i + ǫ). The marginal
benefit of the deviation is
r+2φ(s¯ji)
(φ(0)+φ(s¯ji)+r)
2φ
′(0) ( which becomes r(r+φ(ǫ))2φ
′(ǫ) in case when also
s¯ji = 0). It is clear that the marginal benefit at ǫ = 0 is infinite, while the marginal cost remains
bounded.
Case 2: φ(x) = x and c(x) = x2.
(i) Suppose first that s¯ij = s¯ji = 0. We show that this cannot happen for any finite r > 0.
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(a) If w¯i = 0 consider a deviation in which player i invests ǫ > 0 in contest ij. The cost
of this deviation is ǫ2. The benefit is ǫ
ǫ+r . It is easy to see that the benefit is larger
than the cost, for ǫ small enough, since
ǫ
ǫ+ r
− ǫ2 = ǫ
(
1− rǫ− ǫ2
r + ǫ
)
.
(b) If w¯i > 0 then there exists contest ik such that s¯ik > 0. Consider a deviation in
which player i reallocates ǫ > 0 from ik to ij (keeping w¯i fixed). The marginal
benefit of this deviation for player i, calculated at ǫ = 0 is:
∂
∂ǫ
ǫ
ǫ+ r
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
=
1
r
.
The marginal cost of the deviation is:
∂
∂ǫ
(s¯ik − ǫ)− s¯ki
s¯ik − ǫ+ s¯ki + r
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
= − r + 2s¯ki
(r + s¯ik + s¯ki)2
.
It is easy to check that the marginal benefit outweights the marginal cost. Indeed
1
r
− r + 2s¯ki
(r + s¯ik + s¯ki)2
=
2rs¯ik + (s¯ik + s¯ki)
2
r (r + s¯ik + s¯ki)
2 > 0.
(ii) We now show that when ij ∈ g¯ it cannot be that s¯ij = 0 and s¯ji > 0 when r becomes
infinitesimal. Suppose otherwise, so suppose that this is the case for some two players i
and j.
(a) If w¯i = 0 then a profitable deviation for player i is to exert ǫ > 0 in contest ij.
The marginal cost of this deviation, 2ǫ, approaches to 0 when ǫ→ 0. The marginal
benefit of the proposed deviation,
r+2s¯ji
r+s¯ji+ǫ
, is positive and bounded away from 0.
Hence for ǫ small enough, the proposed deviation is profitable.
(b) Finally, we consider the case when w¯i > 0. First we show that when r → 0 then
s¯ji → 0. Using that, we show that the marginal benefit for player i of investing in
contest ij calculated at 0 becomes unbounded when r approaches 0.
Since, by assumption, s¯ji is greater than zero, it must satisfy the first order opti-
mality (sufficient and necessary) conditions. Thus, the following holds:
r
(s¯ji + r)2
= 2
∑
ℓ
s¯jℓ ⇒
r =

2∑
ℓ 6=i
s¯jℓ + 2s¯ji

 (r + s¯ji)2.
From the last equation above, it is clear that when r → 0 then s¯ji → 0. In this case
(r → 0), the marginal benefit of player i of investing in contest against player j calculated
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at 0 ( equal to
r+2s¯ji
(r+s¯ji)2
) becomes unbounded. Indeed, it can be verified that:
lim
r→0
r + 2s¯ji(r)
(r + s¯ji(r))2
= +∞, (7)
since limr→0 s¯ji(r) = 0. The marginal cost of this deviation is obviously bounded from
above. Therefore, it cannot be that s¯ij = 0 and s¯ji > 0 when r is small enough.
Proofs of Claims from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1.
Uniqueness. Since both g(s∗) and g(s′) are stable, condition (U) from Definition 3 must
hold. In particular, it must hold for any player i and Li = ∅. We note that weighted network
g(s) with structure g¯ will satisfy the condition (U) if and only if s = s¯, where s¯ is the Nash
equilibrium of game C(g¯). Then, Proposition 9 implies that, if g(s∗) and g(s′) are two stable
networks with the same network structure, g¯, then s′ = s∗ = s¯.
Interiority. Follows directly from the proof of the interiority part of Proposition 9.
The following proposition is an extension of Proposition (Franke and Ozturk, 2015, Propo-
sition 2) and provides a foundation for definition of strength (Definition 5).
Proposition 10
Suppose that conditions for the interiority from Proposition 1 are satisfied. Then: w∗i ≥ w∗j ⇒
s∗ij ≤ s∗ji, with equality when w∗i = w∗j .
Proof of Proposition 10. The following first-order conditions for contest ij ∈ g(s∗) must hold:
(
(r + 2φ(s∗ji))φ
′(s∗ij)
(r + φ(s∗ij) + φ(s
∗
ji))
2
− c′(w∗i ) = 0
)
∧
(
(r + 2φ(s∗ij))φ
′(s∗ji)
(r + φ(s∗ij) + φ(s
∗
ji))
2
− c′(w∗j ) = 0
)
. (8)
From (8) we get:
(r + 2φ(s∗ji))φ
′(s∗ij)
(r + 2φ(s∗ij))φ
′(s∗ji)
=
c′(w∗i )
c′(w∗j )
.
Since φ′(x) > 0, φ′′(x) ≤ 0 and c′′(x) > 0:
w∗i ≥ w∗j ⇒
c′(w∗i )
c′(w∗j )
≥ 1⇒ (r + 2φ(s
∗
ji))φ
′(s∗ij)
(r + 2φ(s∗ij))φ
′(s∗ji)
≥ 1⇒ s∗ji ≥ s∗ij, (9)
where the last implication in (9) follows from the facts that φ is an increasing function and φ′
is a decreasing function, and the equality holds when w¯i = w¯j.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the claim, we compare the solutions of the FOC system
associated to links ab and ac. To do this, it is helpful to first consider the following parameterized
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system of equations on R2≥0 with unknowns x and y, and positive parameters β1 and β2:
(r + 2φ(y))φ′(x)
(r + φ(x) + φ(y))2
− c′(β1) = 0, (r + 2φ(x))φ
′(y)
(r + φ(x) + φ(y))2
− c′(β2) = 0. (10)
It is easy to verify that (10) satisfies the conditions of the implicit function theorem. Note that
when β1 = w
∗
a and β2 = w
∗
b , then x = s
∗
ab and y = s
∗
ba is the unique solution of system (10).
Taking the derivative of x and y defined by (10) with respect to β1 we get:
∂x
∂β1
=
c′′(β1) (r + 2φ(x)) (r + φ(x) + φ(y))
2
[
φ′′(y)(r + φ(x) + φ(y))− 2φ′(y)2]
Den
,
∂y
∂β1
=
2c′′(β1)(φ(x) − φ(y))φ′(x)φ′(y)(r + φ(x) + φ(y))2
Den
,
where
Den =2φ′(x)2
(
2φ′(y)2(r + φ(x) + φ(y))− (r + 2φ(x))(r + 2φ(y))φ′′(y))
+ (r + 2φ(x))(r + 2φ(y))φ′′(x)
(
φ′′(y)(r + φ(x) + φ(y)) − 2φ′(y)2) .
For positive x and y, expression Den will be positive, given the properties of functions φ and
c stated in Subsection 2.1. Furthermore, the numerator of ∂x
∂β1
is negative, while the numerator
of ∂y
∂β1
will be negative when φ(x) < φ(y) (and therefore when x < y), and otherwise positive.
Therefore, for the unique solution (x, y) of system 10 the following holds comparative statics
result holds:
∂x
∂β1
< 0,
∂y
∂β1
≤ 0 when x ≤ y,
∂y
∂β1
> 0 when x > y.
(11)
We prove now that s∗ab > s
∗
ac. The other inequalities stated in the claim of the Proposition
are proven analogously. Consider (8) associated to ab and (8) associated to ac, which must hold
in an interior equilibrium s∗.
(r + 2φ(s∗ba))φ
′(s∗ab)
(r + φ(s∗ab) + φ(s
∗
ba))
2
− c′(w∗a) = 0,
(r + 2φ(s∗ab))φ
′(s∗ba)
(r + φ(s∗ab) + φ(s
∗
ba))
2
− c′(w∗b ) = 0. (8 ab)
(r + 2φ(s∗ca))φ
′(s∗ac)
(r + φ(s∗ac) + φ(s
∗
ca))
2
− c′(w∗a) = 0,
(r + 2φ(s∗ac))φ
′(s∗ca)
(r + φ(s∗ac) + φ(s
∗
ca))
2
− c′(w∗c ) = 0. (8 ac)
We can think of (8 ab) as a system of equations (10) with unknowns s∗ab, s
∗
ba, where w
∗
a and
w∗b are playing a role of β1 and β2, and analogously for (8 ac). By assumption w
∗
a < w
∗
b and
w∗a < w
∗
b . Then, Proposition 10 implies that s
∗
ab > s
∗
ba, and s
∗
ac > s
∗
ca respectively. Taking this
into account and comparing systems (8 ab) and (8 ac), the second inequality in (11) implies
that s∗ab > s
∗
ac.
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We now state and prove an important corollary of Proposition 2 which states that the total
equilibrium investment w∗ is increasing with the neighborhood of a player, with respect to the
relation of set inclusion.
Corollary 1 (of Proposition 2)
Let Ni ( Nj in stable network g, then w
∗
i < w
∗
j .
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose the claim does not hold. So, suppose that Ni ( Nj and w
∗
i ≥
w∗j . Then, from Proposition 2 it follows that for every k ∈ Ni ∩ Nj s∗ik ≤ s∗jk. But then
w∗i =
∑
k∈Ni
s∗ik ≤
∑
k∈Ni
s∗jk <
∑
k∈Nj
s∗jk = w
∗
j , which is in contradiction with w
∗
i ≥ w∗j .
We now state and prove Lemmas 1 to 4 which are concerned with attackers in a stable
network. Our main goal is to show that there can be only one class of attackers in LFPS
network. For clarity, we do this in several steps, each step being a separate lemma. We first
show that attackers always have links with weakest players in the network (Lemma 1). We use
Lemma 1 extensively in proofs of subsequent claims in the paper. An useful corollary of this
lemma is that a stable network must be connected. We continue by showing that members of
the same class of attackers must have the same neighborhood (Lemma 2), and that two different
class of attackers cannot have nested neighborhoods (Lemma 3). Finally, using Lemmas 1 - 3
we show that there can be only one class of attackers (Lemma 4).
Lemma 1
If ij ∈ g(s∗), and g is LFPS, then ik ∈ g ∀(k ∈ N) : w∗k ≥ w∗j .
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that g(s∗) is stable, and such that for some player i and two
other players j, k with w∗j < w
∗
k we have ij ∈ g(s∗) and ik /∈ g(s∗). We show that in this case
there exists a profitable deviation for players i and j, hence g(s∗) cannot be stable.
First note that if contest ij is not profitable for i, then it cannot be part of the stable
network ((B) does not hold).
When ij is profitable for i, it must be w∗i < w
∗
j . We show that there is a profitable bilateral
deviation for i and j. Consider a deviation in which j deviates from s∗j to s
′
j such that s
′
ji = 0
and s′jℓ = s
∗
jℓ for all ℓ 6= i. At the same time, i deviates to s′i such that s′ik = s∗ij, s′ij = 0 and
s′iℓ = s
∗
iℓ for all ℓ /∈ {j, k}. It is clear that this deviation is profitable for j. We prove that it
is also profitable for i. It is enough to prove that the expected reaction of k to the proposed
deviation, denoted by sˆki, is such that sˆki < s
∗
ji. To do this, we note that s
∗
ji must satisfy the
following optimality condition:
(r + 2φ(s∗ij))φ
′(s∗ji)
(r + φ(s∗ij) + φ(s
∗
ji))
2
= c′(w∗j ). (12)
The expected reaction of player k to the proposed deviation is determined with the following
condition:
(r + 2φ(s∗ij))φ
′(sˆki)
(r + φ(s∗ij) + φ(sˆki))
2
= c′(w∗k + sˆki). (13)
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Since w∗k + sˆki > w
∗
k ≥ w∗j it must be that c′(w∗k + sˆki) > c′(w∗j ). This is due to strict
convexity of c. Thus the right hand side of (13) is strictly larger than the right hand side
of (12). The same relation must hold for the left hand sides of (12) and (13). Since φ is an
increasing function and φ′ is a decreasing function, this holds only when sˆki < s
∗
ji.
Corollary 2 (of Lemma 1)
A non-empty stable network g(s∗) is connected.
Proof of Corollary 2: We use a proof by contradiction. Assume that the claim does not
hold, so there are at least two components in stable network g. Choose two components (C1
and C2) from g such that the weakest player in the network (v1) belongs to C1. All opponents
of v1 must find the contest with v1 profitable, otherwise the network would not be stable ((B)
would not hold). Then, the strongest player in C2 (denote her with a2) by Lemma 1 has an
incentive to form a link with v1 instead of a link with one of her current opponents, who by
definition is not weaker than v1. If |C2| = 1, a2 does not have any opponents. Then, she has
an incentive to form a link with v1 with action s
∗
a1,v1
, since a1v1 ∈ g is a profitable contest for
a1.
Lemma 2
Two players that belong to the same class of attackers Wa have the same neighborhood in stable
network g.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let g be a stable network. Consider any two attackers i, j ∈ Wa, and
suppose, contrary to what is asserted, that Ni 6= Nj . It cannot be that Ni ⊂ Nj because then
the total spending of i and j would not be equal (by Corollary 1). Since Ni 6= Nj , there exist
nodes h ∈ Ni\Nj and k ∈ Nj\Ni. Suppose that, without loss of generality, w∗k ≥ w∗h. Then it is
profitable for player i to replace ih with link ik according to Lemma 1. This is in contradiction
with the assumption that g is stable.
Lemma 3
Let i and j be two attackers in stable network g(s∗). It cannot be that Ni ⊂ Nj .
Proof of Lemma 3. If i and j belong to the same class, then Lemma 2 implies Ni = Nj.
Consider now the case when i and j belong to different classes of attackers. We assume that
Ni ⊂ Nj and show that there will always exist a profitable deviation. We will use Ni to denote
the neighborhood of i in network g(s∗).
Since Ni ⊂ Nj , by Corollary 1 it must be w∗i < w∗j .
Suppose first that πj(g(s
∗)) ≥ πi(g(s∗)). We show that in this case i can form links to all
players in Li = Nj \Ni, and obtain a payoff greater than πj(g(s∗)). To show this, consider the
deviation in which player i deviates to s˜i = s
∗
j . Let us denote the payoff of player i after this
deviation with πi(g(s˜i, sˆLi , s
∗
−i−Li
)) where sˆLi is defined in (4). We proceed by showing that
πi(g(s˜i, sˆLi , s
∗
−i−Li
)) > πj(g(s
∗)).
Because w∗i < w
∗
j , Proposition 2 implies that s
∗
ki < s
∗
kj k ∈ Ni ∩ Nj . The convexity of
the cost function implies that sˆki < s
∗
kj for all k ∈ Li under the contemplated deviation. This
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means that after the deviation the expected cost of i will be equal to the cost of j, i and j
will have the same set of opponents, and φ(s˜ik)−φ(sˆki)
φ(s˜ik)+φ(sˆki)+r
>
φ(s∗
jk
)−φ(s∗
kj
)
φ(s∗
jk
)+φ(s∗
kj
)+r ∀k ∈ Nj . Therefore
πi(g(s˜i, sˆLi , s
∗
−i−Li
)) > πj(g(s
∗)) ≥ πj(g(s∗)).
Suppose now that πi(g(s
∗)) > πj((s
∗)), and suppose that j does not have an incentive to
update her strategy (otherwise the network would not be stable).13 From πi(g(s
∗)) > πj((s
∗))
it follows that:
∑
k∈Ni
πik(s
∗
ik, s
∗
ki; r) > −c(w∗j ) + c(w∗i ) +
∑
k∈Nj
πjk(s
∗
jk, s
∗
kj; r). (14)
Consider now the same deviation of player i, as contemplated in the first part of the proof. We
get (using Ni to denote neighborhood of i in network g(s
∗)):
πi(g(s˜i, sˆLi , s
∗
−i−Li
))− πi(g(s∗)) =∑
k∈Ni
πik(s
∗
jk, s
∗
ki; r) +
∑
k∈Li
πik(s
∗
jk, sˆki; r)−
∑
k∈Ni
πik(s
∗
ik, s
∗
ki; r)− c(w∗j ) + c(w∗i ) >
∑
k∈Ni
πik(s
∗
jk, s
∗
ki; r) +
∑
k∈Li
πik(s
∗
jk, sˆki; r)−

−c(w∗j ) + c(w∗i ) + ∑
k∈Nj
πjk(s
∗
jk, s
∗
kj; r)

− c(w∗j ) + c(w∗i ) =
∑
k∈Ni
πik(s
∗
jk, s
∗
ki; r) +
∑
k∈Li
πik(s
∗
jk, sˆki; r)−
∑
k∈Nj
πjk(s
∗
jk, s
∗
kj; r) > 0,
where the first inequality comes directly from (14) and the last inequality comes from the fact
that sˆki < s
∗
kj for all k ∈ Li. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4
There is only one class of attackers (W1) in stable network g(s
∗). Members of W1 are connected
to all players outside W1.
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose, contrary to what is asserted, that there are two different classes
of attackers W1 and W2 in LFPS network g(s
∗). Since Lemma 2 implies that all members of the
same class of attackers have the same neighborhood, we restrict our attention to representative
nodes i ∈W1 and j ∈W2.
Since w∗j > w
∗
i there are 2 possible situations that we need to consider:
(i) Ni ⊂ Nj is ruled out by Lemma 3.
(ii) Ni 6⊂ Nj =⇒ (∃k ∈ Ni\Nj ∧ ∃h ∈ Nj\Ni). If w∗k ≥ w∗h Lemma 1 implies that j has a
profitable deviation. If w∗k < w
∗
h the same lemma implies that i has a profitable deviation.
We now prove a lemma which is concerned with hybrids. In the proof we rely on arguments
which are analogous to those used in the proof of Lemma 4.
13Recall that since j is an attacker, any of her opponents would be better off by destroying a link with
j.
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Lemma 5
In a stable network g(s∗) all members of a hybrid class are connected to all other nodes in the
network that do not belong to their class.
Proof of Lemma 5: If there are only two classes of nodes in a stable network (W1 and W2)
then there are no hybrid types. Suppose there are more than two classes of nodes in a stable
network. First, let us consider the strongest mixed type class (W2). A node h ∈ W2 must
be connected to all nodes from W1. This is because hybrid h must be connected to at least
one player that is stronger than her, who must be an attacker since h ∈ W2. Then, Lemma 4
implies that h must be connected to all players from W1, since all nodes in W1 have the same
neighborhood. This holds for any h ∈W2.
Let us now prove that all members of the class W2 have the same neighborhood. Suppose
this is not true. Let h1 and h2 be two players from W2 such that Nh1 6= Nh2 . The following
implication holds: (W1 ⊂ Nh1 ∧ W1 ⊂ Nh2) ⇒ ((Nh1/Nh2) ∪ (Nh2/Nh1)) ∩ W1 = ∅. Thus,
N¯h1 = N¯h2 and ¯
Nh1 6= ¯Nh2 . It cannot be ¯Nh1 ⊂ ¯Nh2 ∨ ¯Nh2 ⊂ ¯Nh1 because then it would be
w∗h1 6= w∗h2 by Corollary 1. Consider two nodes, k ∈ ¯Nh1 \ ¯Nh2 and ℓ ∈ ¯Nh2 \ ¯Nh1 . If w
∗
k ≥ w∗ℓ
then h2 and ℓ have a profitable deviation (link h2ℓ is destroyed, link h2k is formed). If w
∗
k < w
∗
ℓ ,
then h1 and k have an analogous profitable deviation.
Let W3 be the third strongest class in the network. If M = 3 then, by definition, all
players in W2 must be connected to some players from W3, because otherwise they would not
be hybrid types. Note that if player i ∈W3 is connected to some player from class W2 then she
is connected to all players from class W2 - because we have shown that all members of class W2
have the same neighborhood. If there exists player j ∈ W3 who is not connected to all players
from W2, then j is only connected to all players from W1. But then i and j cannot belong to
the same class. So, for K = 3 the claim of the lemma holds.
SupposeM > 3. Lemma 1 implies that all members ofW1 must be connected to all members
of W3 since they are connected to all members of W2. We now show that all players from W2
are connected to all players from W3. Again we proceed by using a proof by contradiction.
Suppose that there exist players i ∈ W2 and j ∈ W3 such that ij /∈ g(s∗). We show that in
this case there is a profitable deviation. Since all players from W2 have the same neighborhood
there are no links between members of class W2 and j. This means that j loses only in contests
with players from W1. Hence, j has control over all of her links except links with players from
W1. Furthermore, w
∗
i < w
∗
j ⇒ Ni 6= Nj . There are two possibilities for relation between Ni and
Nj that we need to consider:
(i) Ni ⊂ Nj case can be ruled out by applying the same argument as in Lemma 3 to
¯
Ni and
¯
Nj .
(ii) Ni 6⊂ Nj ⇒ (∃k ∈ Ni\Nj ∧ ∃h ∈ Nj\Ni). But then, if w∗k ≥ w∗h Lemma 1 implies that
j has a profitable deviation, and if w∗k < w
∗
h, the same Lemma implies that i has a profitable
deviation.
We have shown that in a stable network it cannot happen that there are no links between
members ofW2 andW3. If two players fromW2 andW3 are connected, than all players fromW2
and W3 are connected, because all players from W2 have the same neighborhood, and because
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of Lemma 1.
Using the same reasoning as above, we can show that all players fromWk must be connected
to all players from Wk+1. Since the number of nodes in the network is finite, the number of
classes is finite and this procedure reaches WM in a finite number of steps.
Corollary 3
There is only one class of victims in a stable network g and all victims have the same neighbor-
hood
Proof of Corollary 3: Follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
We show now that classes must be of different sizes, and that stronger players belong to
more numerous classes.
Lemma 6
Let |Wk| denote the number of nodes that belong to class Wk in stable network g(s∗). Then
|Wk| > |Wk+1| ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,M − 1}.
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose that the claim does not hold, so |Wk| ≤ |Wk+1| for some k =
1, ...,M − 1. The system (8) implies that for any player a, s∗ac = s∗ad whenever d and c belong
to the same class. Therefore, for any two players a, b such that a ∈ Wk and b ∈ Wk+1, we
have that w∗a =
∑
i 6=k,c∈Wi
|Wi|s∗ac and w∗b =
∑
i 6=k+1,c∈Wi
|Wi|s∗bc. Since w∗a < w∗b , Proposition
2 implies s∗ac > s
∗
bc, c ∈ {W1,W2..,WK} \ {Wk,Wk+1}. Furthermore, since w∗a < w∗b we have
that s∗ab > s
∗
ba according to Proposition 10. But then |Wk| < |Wk+1| ⇒
∑
i 6=k,c∈Wi
|Wi|s∗ac >∑
i 6=k+1,c∈Wi
|Wi|s∗bc ⇒ w∗a > w∗b . This is in contradiction with a ∈Wk and b ∈Wk+1.
Proof of Proposition 3: From Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and Corollary 3 it directly follows that a
nonempty stable network g must be a complete M -partite network. Lemma 6 directly implies
the asymmetry in sizes.
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider game C(Kn−v,v). Proposition 9 states that there is a
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium s¯ of game C(Kn−v,v). The equilibrium is interior, under
maintained assumptions. Since s¯ is the NE of C(Kn−v,v), g(s¯) satisfies (U) for Li = ∅. The
only new links that can possibly be formed in g(s¯) are with members of own partition. It is
easy to see that no player will have an incentive to form a link with a member of own partition
in g(s¯), since all members of the same partition have the same total spending. Hence, s¯ satisfies
condition (U) from Definition 3. In the remaining part of the proof we show that part (B) of
Definition 3 will be satisfied when v < v∗.
First note that a deviation in which players i ∈ A and j ∈ V destroy link ij is profitable for
player j ∈ V , simply because she is a victim. We will now show that there exists v∗ > 0 such
that i ∈ A prefers to destroy link with j ∈ V in Kn−v,v whenever v ≥ v∗. To this end, let us
define functions h : R3≥0 → R≥0 and f : R3≥0 → R≥0 by:
h(v, s, r) = max
x
{
x− s
x+ s+ r
v − α(vx)2
}
, (15)
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f(n, v, r) = h(v − 1, s¯v,n−v, r)− h(v, s¯v,n−v , r), (16)
where s¯v,n−v denotes the Nash equilibrium per-contest investments of a member of V in C(Kn−v,v).
Due to symmetry, all members of the same partition will play the same strategy in s¯. Note that
f(n, v, r) is the expected benefit of destroying a link of an attacker in network g(s¯), where s¯ is
the Nash equilibrium of C(Kn−v,v).
We now show that function f is monotonically increasing in v ∈ [1, a] and that it takes a
positive value when v is big. We will treat v as a continuous variable in the remaining part of
the proof.
We show now that for v ∈ [1, a] = [1, n − v],
f (n, v − 1, r) < f (n, v, r) .
In order to do this, we first show that h decreases with s, and that it decreases faster with
s for higher values of v (∂h
∂s
decreases with v). Indeed, taking the derivative of h with respect
to s we get:
∂h
∂s
=
∂h
∂x
∂x
∂s
+
∂h
∂s
= − 2x+ r
(x+ s+ r)2
v, (17)
where we used the fact that ∂h
∂x
= 0, since x is the maximizer of h. Differentiating with respect
to v we get:
∂2h
∂v∂s
= 2
[
− x+
r
2
(x+ s+ r)2
+ v
x− s
(x+ s+ r)3
∂x
∂v
]
. (18)
The above derivative will be negative for all positive values of s and x such that x ≥ s and
∂x
∂v
< 0. This will hold in particular when v ∈ [1, a] - since in the Nash equilibrium of C(Kn−v,v),
the attackers exert a higher effort than the victims (x ≥ s) and the investment of members of
A decreases with v (∂x
∂v
< 0).
From (17) and (18) we have that when v ∈ [1, a)
∂ [h(v − 1, s, r)− h(v, s, r)]
∂s
> 0. (19)
Since s¯v−1,n−v+1 < s¯v−1,n−v < s¯v,n−v from (19) directly follows that:
h(v − 1, s¯v,n−v , r)− h(v, s¯v,n−v , r) > h(v − 1, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r)− h(v, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r)⇒
f(n, v, r) > h(v − 1, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r)− h(v, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r).
Finally, using the fact that h is concave in v (directly follows from the concavity of payoff
function x−s
x+s+rv− (vx)2 in v, see (De la Fuente, 2000, Theorems 2.12. and 2.13) for the formal
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argument), the following holds:
h(v − 1, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r)− h(v, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r) > h(v − 2, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r)− h(v − 1, s¯v−1,n−v+1, r),
and therefore:
f(n, v, r) > f(n, v − 1, r),
which is what we wanted to prove.
If for v = 1, f takes a positive value, than no Kn−v,v is stable, and v
∗ = 1. If for v = 1 f
takes a negative value, this means that star network is stable. We also know that when v = a
no player earns positive payoff from any contest, so f takes a positive value in this case. The
fact that f is strictly monotone, and that it changes sign implies that there exists v∗ ∈ [1, a]
such that f(n, v, r) ≥ 0 for v ≥ v∗ and f(n, v, r) < 0 for v < v∗, which completes the proof.
Proofs of Claims from Section 4
We first show that the contest game on a complete bipartite network is a nice aggregative game
(Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013), so we can use results from that paper for some of our comparative
statics exercises. For the cases when results from (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013) cannot be
directly applied, we rely on the implicit function derivation of the equilibrium conditions.
Lemma 7
The contest game on a complete bipartite network C (Ka,v) can be represented as a nice aggrega-
tive game as defined in Acemoglu and Jensen (2013).
Proof of Lemma 7: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game C(Ka,v) is such that all
players from the same class play the same strategy and invest the same amount of effort in
each of their contest. When with φ(x) = x the conditions which determine the equilibrium
investments in C(Ka,v) are equivalent to the system of FOCs that pins down the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of two players game in which the strategy space of each player is the set of
nonnegative real numbers and the payoffs are defined by:
πi(sij , sji; r) =
sij − sji
sij + sji + r
− 1
v
c(vsij),
πj(sji, sij; r) =
sji − sij
sij + sji + r
− 1
a
c(asij).
Since
sij−sji
sij+sji+r
= −1 + 2sij+r
sij+sji+r
it is straightforward to verify that this game is a nice
aggregative game studied in (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013).
Proof of Proposition 5.
1. According to Lemma 7, the contest game on a complete bipartite network can be rep-
resented as a nice aggregative game. To prove that w∗ decreases with α, it is sufficient
to show that a decrease in α is a positive shock (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013, Definition
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9). A decrease in α will lead to a new cost function c˜ such that c˜′(x) < c′(x) ∀x ∈ R≥0.
Denote with π˜i the payoff function of player i ∈ A (and symmetrically for j ∈ V ) after c
becomes c˜. It is straightforward to see that ∂π˜i
∂sij
≤ ∂πi
∂sij
when c˜′(vsij) ≤ c′(vsij). Therefore
a decrease in α is a positive shock. Analogously, a change in transfer T from T = 1 to
T = T˜ > 1 is a positive shock to both players.
2. To conduct a comparative statics exercise with respect to r we cannot apply the result
for aggregative games, as an increase in r can be a positive shock for one player, and, at
the same time, a negative shock for some other player. Indeed,
∂2πi
∂sij∂r
=
sij − 3sji − r
(sij + sji + r)3
,
does not have the same sign for all non-negative arguments. Therefore, we rely on the
implicit function theorem. The strategy profile s∗ satisfies the first order optimality
conditions:
r + 2s∗ji
(s∗ij + s
∗
ji + r)
2
= c′
(∑
k∈V
s∗ik
)
, i ∈ A,
r + 2s∗ij
(s∗ij + s
∗
ji + r)
2
= c′
(∑
k∈A
s∗jk
)
, j ∈ V.
(20)
Taking the derivative of (20) with respect to r we get the following system of equations:
1 + 2s∗ji(r)
(r + s∗ij(r) + s
∗
ji(r))
2
− 2(r + 2s
∗
ji(r))(1 + s
∗
ij
′(r) + s∗ji
′(r))
(1 + s∗ij(r) + s
∗
ji(r))
2
= c′′
(∑
k∈V
s∗ik(r)
)∑
k∈V
s∗ik
′(r), i ∈ A
1 + 2s∗ij(r)
(r + s∗ij(r) + s
∗
ji(r))
2
− 2(r + 2s
∗
ij(r))(1 + s
∗
ij
′(r) + s∗ji
′(r))
(1 + s∗ij(r) + s
∗
ji(r))
2
= c′′
(∑
k∈A
s∗jk(r)
)∑
k∈A
s∗jk
′(r), j ∈ V
Using the symmetry, and solving for s∗ij
′(r) and s∗ji
′(r) we get:
s∗ij
′(r) = −2 + a(r + s
∗
ij + s
∗
ji)(r − s∗ij + 3s∗ji)c′′2
Ω
s∗ji
′(r) = −2 + v(r + s
∗
ij + s
∗
ji)(r − s∗ji + 3s∗ij)c′′1
Ω
(21)
where
Ω = 4+ (r+ s∗ij + s
∗
ji)×[
2vc′′1(r+ s
∗
ij)+ ac
′′
2
(
r3vc′′1 +3r
2vc′′1(s
∗
ij + s
∗
ji)+ r(2+ 3v(s
∗
ij + s
∗
ji)
2c′′1)+ 4s
∗
ji+ v(s
∗
ij + s
∗
ji)
3c′′1
)]
,
and c′′1 = c
′′
(∑
k∈V s
∗
ik
)
and c′′2 = c
′′
(∑
k∈A s
∗
jk
)
.
The expression Ω is positive, since c is a convex function. Furthermore a > v and
s∗ij > s
∗
ji imply that s
∗
ji
′(r) in (21) is always negative. On the other hand, s∗ij
′(r) can be
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both positive and negative. It will take a positive value whenever:
s∗ij >
2
a(r + s∗ij + s
∗
ji)c
′′
2
+ r + 3s∗ji.
We now discuss the sign of ∂w
∗
∂r
. From (21) we get:
∂w∗(r)
∂r
> 0⇔ − [v(r + 3s∗ij − s∗ji)c′′1 + a(r + 3s∗ji − s∗ij)c′′2] > 4r + s∗ij + s∗ji . (22)
When c(x) = αx2, equation (22) simplifies to
∂w∗(r)
∂r
> 0⇔ −α [v(r + 3s∗ij − s∗ji) + a(r + 3s∗ji − s∗ij)] > 2r + s∗ij + s∗ji .
The above inequality will hold when a(r + 3s∗ji − s∗ij) is sufficiently small and negative.
This will happen when a is large enough relative to v, and r is small enough.
In a specific case when r → 0 (22) becomes
− [a(3s∗ji − s∗ij) + v(3s∗ij − s∗ji)] > 2α(s∗ij + s∗ji) .
In this case (see Franke and Ozturk (2015) for derivation) s∗ji =
(
v
a
) 1
2 s∗ij and s
∗
ij + s
∗
ji =
1
α
1
2 (av)
1
4
, so the above inequality can be written as
[
(a− 3v) +
(v
a
) 1
2
(v − 3a)
]
s∗ij >
2
α
1
2
(av)
1
4 . (23)
From (21) it follows that (23) can hold only when s∗ij > 3s
∗
ji, as otherwise s
∗
ij
′(r) ≤ 0.
Using the fact that s∗ij + s
∗
ji =
1
α
1
2 (av)
1
4
, we rewrite this condition as s∗ij >
3
4α
1
2
(av)−
1
4
which, together with (23), gives that ∂w
∗
∂r
> 0 if
[
(a− 3v) +
(v
a
) 1
2
(v − 3a)
]
3
4α
1
2
(av)−
1
4 >
2
α
1
2
(av)
1
4 ,
which is true whenever a ≥ 37v.
Lemma 8
The total spending of each node in the equilibrium is defined as a solution of system (5). Fur-
themore
πi(s
∗) =
∑
j∈Ni
w∗j − w∗i
w∗j + w
∗
i
− αw∗i 2. (24)
Proof of Lemma 8. Expressing s∗ij from (8), when φ is identity mapping, and ci(x) = αix
2
we get that in the equilibrium:
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s∗ij =
4αjw
∗
j
(2αiw∗i + 2αjw
∗
j )
2
− r
2
. (25)
Summing over all contests of player i, and setting αi = α i 6= k and αk = α+ ǫk we get (5).
Plugging in (25) in (2) we get (24).
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose first that k ∈ A. Due to the symmetry, (5) is reduced to
the following system of equations:
w∗k = v
αw∗j
(αw∗j +(α+ ǫk)w
∗
k)
2
− v r
2
,
w∗i = v
αw∗j
(αw∗j +αw
∗
i )
2
− v r
2
, i ∈A and i 6= k,
w∗j = (a− 1)
αw∗i
(αw∗j +αw
∗
i )
2
+
(α+ ǫk)w
∗
k
(αw∗j +(α+ ǫk)w
∗
k)
2
− ar
2
, j ∈ V.
(26)
Differentiating with respect to ǫk, and letting ǫk → 0 we get the following linear system in first
derivatives:(
1+
2
α
v
w∗j
(w∗k +w
∗
j )
3
)
w∗k
′ =
v
α
w∗k−w∗j
(w∗k +w
∗
j )
3
w∗j
′− v
2α2
w∗kw
∗
j
(w∗k +w
∗
j )
3
,
(
1+
2
α
v
w∗j
(w∗i +w
∗
j )
3
)
w∗i
′ =
v
α
w∗i −w∗j
(w∗i +w
∗
j )
3
w∗j
′,
(
1+
2
α
(a− 1)w∗i +w∗k
(w∗i +w
∗
j )
3
)
w∗j
′ =
a− 1
α
w∗j −w∗i
(w∗j +w
∗
i )
3
w∗i
′+
1
α
w∗j −w∗k
(w∗j +w
∗
i )
3
w∗k
′− 1
α2
w∗k
2−w∗jw∗k
(w∗j +w
∗
k)
3
.
(27)
Using the fact that, when ǫk → 0, then w∗i = w∗k, we get(
(w∗i + w
∗
j ) +
2
α
v
w∗j
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
)
w∗k
′ =
v
α
w∗i − w∗j
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
w∗j
′ − v
2α2
w∗iw
∗
j
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
,
(
(w∗i + w
∗
j ) +
2
α
v
w∗j
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
)
w∗i
′ =
v
α
w∗i − w∗j
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
w∗j
′,
(
(w∗j + w
∗
i ) +
2
α
a
w∗i
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
)
w∗j
′ =
a− 1
α
w∗j − w∗i
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
w∗i
′ +
1
α
w∗j − w∗i
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
w∗k
′ − 1
α2
w∗i
2 − w∗jw∗i
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
.
When r → 0, w∗i and w∗j simplify to
w∗i =
v
α
w∗j
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
, w∗j =
a
α
w∗i
(w∗i + w
∗
j )
2
,
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and therefore we can write (27) as
(3w∗i + w
∗
j )w
∗
k
′ =
vw∗j − aw∗i
a
w∗j
′ − 2
α
w∗i
2,
(3w∗i + w
∗
j )w
∗
i
′ =
vw∗j − aw∗i
a
w∗j
′,
(w∗i + 3w
∗
j )w
∗
j
′ =
aw∗i − vw∗j
va
w∗k
′ + (a− 1)aw
∗
i − vw∗j
va
w∗i
′ +
w∗i
α
aw∗i − vw∗j
va
.
(28)
We note that the equilibrium strengths in Ka,v can be expressed as (see Franke and Ozturk
(2015) for derivation):
w∗i =
1√
α
v
√
a√
v +
√
a
1
(av)
1
4
,
w∗j =
1√
α
a
√
v√
v +
√
a
1
(av)
1
4
.
(29)
Plugging (29) in (28) and solving the resulting linear system we get:
w∗k
′ = −(av)
3
4
(
(
√
a−√v)2 + 8a√v (√a+√v))
4a
√
a(
√
a+ 3
√
v)(
√
a+
√
v)2α
√
α
< 0,
w∗i
′ = − (av)
3
4 (
√
a−√v)2
4a
√
a(
√
a+ 3
√
v)(
√
a+
√
v)2α
√
α
< 0,
w∗j
′ =
√
v(
√
a−√v)
4α
√
α(va)
1
4 (
√
a+
√
v)2
> 0.
(30)
The case when k ∈ V is analogous (or just change switch v and a).
Finally from (30) and (29) we get:
∂w∗
∂ǫk
|ǫk=0 =
1
av
(
w∗k
′ + (a− 1)w∗i ′ + vw∗j ′
)
= − v
4α
3
2 (av)
5
4
< 0,
which completes the proof.
Proofs of Claims from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider contest network g(s) such that ij /∈ g for some players i
and j. We show that g(s) is not Nash stable when φ
′(0)
r
> c′(0).
(i) Consider first the case when player i is not involved in any contest, thus wi = 0. The
marginal benefit of investing ǫ > 0 in contest ij calculated at ǫ = 0 is φ
′(0)
r
. The marginal
cost of this action is c′(0). As long as φ
′(0)
r
> c′(0) player i will wish to start a contest
with player j.
(ii) When wi > 0, there must exist some some k such that sik > 0. We discuss two possible
cases:
(a) There exists a contest ik ∈ g(s) such that sik ≥ ski. Consider a deviation in which i
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reallocates ǫ > 0 from contest ik to start contest with j. The marginal benefit of this
action for i is φ
′(0)
r
. The marginal cost of a proposed deviation is (r+2φ(ski))φ
′(sik)
(r+φ(sik)+φ(ski))2
.
The following chain of inequalities holds:
(r + 2φ(ski))φ
′(sik)
(r + φ(sik) + φ(ski))2
≤ r + 2φ(ski)
(r + 2φ(ski))2
φ′(sik) ≤ 1
r + 2φ(ski)
φ′(0) <
1
r
φ′(0), (31)
where we have used the fact that φ is increasing and concave function. So, in this
case, the marginal benefit of the proposed deviation is greater than it’s marginal
cost.
(b) There is no ik ∈ g(s) such that sik ≥ ski. In this case consider a deviation in which
i reallocates sik from contest ik to ij. The change in payoff due to this deviation is
equal to
(
φ(sik)
φ(sik)+r
− φ(ski)
φ(ski)+r
)
− φ(sik)−φ(ski)
φ(sik)+φ(ski)+r
. Simplifying we get:
φ(sik)
φ(sik) + r
− φ(ski)
φ(ski) + r
=
φ(sik)− φ(ski)
φ(sik)φ(ski)
r
+ φ(sik) + φ(ski) + r
>
φ(sik)− φ(ski)
φ(sik) + φ(ski) + r
,
where for the last inequality we used the fact that sik < ski, and φ is increasing.
Hence, provided that φ
′(0)
r
> c′(0), Nash stable network g(s) must be such that sij + sji > 0,
for any pair of players i and j, that is ij ∈ g,∀i, j ∈ N .
We have proved that a Nash stable network must be the complete network. We now argue
that there is a unique strategy profile s such that the complete network g(s) is Nash stable.
Moreover, s is such that sij = sji = s > 0, for any two players i and j.
To do that, we recall that there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
C(g¯) when g¯ is the complete network. In this equilibrium each player must play the symmetric
strategy, as otherwise the uniqueness result would not hold.14 The condition φ
′(0)
r
> c′(0)
ensures that s¯ 6= 0, by same argument as used in (i) of this proof. It directly follows from the
definition of a Nash stable network that it must be sij = s¯ij, where s¯ is the Nash equilibrium
of the contest game on the complete network.
Finally, when φ
′(0)
r
≤ c′(0) exerting positive amount of resources in contest against opponent
who invests 0 is never profitable. Furthermore, if for any pair of players we have sij > 0 and
sji > 0 and, without loss of generality, sij ≥ sji, then the marginal loss of i in decreasing sij is
always smaller then the marginal gain measured by the cost decrease, as long as φ
′(0)
r
≤ c′(0).
Indeed, the following chain of inequalities hold:
(r + 2φ(sji))φ
′(sij)
(r + φ(sij) + φ(sji))2
<
1
r
φ′(0) ≤ c′(0) < c′(wi),
where the first inequality comes from (31). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. Omitted.
14If s¯ was asymmetric, by relabeling players we could find more than one pure strategy NE of the
contest game on the complete network, which would contradict the uniqueness result.
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Online Appendix B
LPFS as a resting point of a dynamic process of network forma-
tion
We can think of the stable networks from Definition 3 as stable states of the coupled dynamic
process we present in this section. Players make decisions about their links and about actions
assigned to these links. We assume that a link between players i and j is formed if one player
decides to form it (unilateral), while link ij is destroyed if both agents agree to destroy it
(bilateral). Time is indexed with t ∈ N ∪ {0}. In t = 0 an arbitrary contest network g(s) is
given.
For each period t:
(i) At the beginning of period t strategy profile st−1 is a pure strategy NE of game C(g¯t−1),
where network g¯t−1 describes the set of contests from the end of period t− 1.
(ii) Players i and j are chosen randomly from the population. They jointly choose their linking
patterns which leads to a network of interactions g¯t. Players calculate the expected benefit
from forming a link as described in Subsection 2.2.
(iii) The second dynamic process (action adjustment process15) starts, and all agents update
their actions given g¯t according to the action adjustment process formally described below.
This process settles at the pure strategy NE of game C(g¯t).
We now formally describe the action adjustment process mentioned in (iii) above. Let ∇iπi
denote the gradient of the payoff function with respect to si. Define function J :
∏
iR
n
≥0 →∏
iR
n
≥0 with:
J(s) =


∇1π1(s)
∇2π2(s)
...
∇nπn(s)

 .
The action adjustment process is defined with:
s˙ = λJ(s), (32)
where λ is a constant. It is clear that s¯ is the stable state of this process. We also prove that s¯ is
a globally asymptotically stable state of (32). To show this, we show that the rate of change of
||J || = JJ ′ is always negative (and equal to 0 in the equilibrium). Denote with H the Jacobian
of J . The following holds:
˙JJ ′ = (Hs˙)′J + J ′Hs˙ = (J ′H′J + J ′HJ) = J ′(H′ +H)J < 0,
15We assume that this process takes place in continuous time and therefore on a faster time-scale than
the network formation process. That is players infinitely more often revise their investment in ongoing
contests compared to contemplating starting/ending a contest
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that (H′ + H) is a negative definite matrix,
and H′ is the transposed matrix H. Thus, if every player adjusts her actions according to the
adjustment process in (32), the action adjustment process converges, irrespective of the initial
conditions. Thus, we have proved Proposition 11.
Proposition 11
The action adjustment process given by equation (32) is globally asymptotically stable.
We do not study the properties of the dynamical process of network formation. However,
it is clear from the definition that if this process settles on a single network configuration, then
this network must be LPFS. It is interesting to note that Proposition 11 has a very practical
application. It provides an efficient way to numerically calculate the Nash equilibrium of game
C(g¯).
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